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TRUSTS-SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS-REDUCTION IN INCOME AS JUSTIFICATION 
FOR TERMINATION IN FAVOR OF BENEFICIARY-Testatrix died in 1913 leav-
ing a will which established a $20,000 spendthrift trust. The income from 
this trust was to be paid to her son for life with the remainder, in default 
of issue and the exercise of a general testamentary power of appointment, 
to go to the other descendants of the testatrix then living.1 The stated 
purpose of the trust was to assure her son of "a support throughout his 
1 The son claimed that a life estate coupled with a general power of appointment 
constituted an estate tantamount to a fee. In discounting this issue, the court com-
mented that a life estate under a spendthrift trust will not coalesce or merge with an 
estate in remainder. Principal case at 336. See also Wormser Estate, 85 D. & C. 526 (1953). 
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. . . whole life, under any circumstances.''2 The son, 65 years old and 
without issue, sought to terminate the trust on the ground that he was 
about to be retired with little probability of obtaining further employment 
and faced the prospect of being unable to support himself and his wife. 
The income of the trust had fallen substantially and at the time amounted 
to only $660 a year.8 The lower court allowed a partial invasion of the 
corpus. On appeal, held, reversed. After the death of the settlor a partial 
reduction of income is insufficient to constitute such a failure of purpose 
of a spendthrift trust as to warrant its termination or modification, when 
such a decree would benefit the life tenant. In re Bosler's Estate, 378 
Pa. 333, 107 A. (2d) 443 (1954). 
Even though all the beneficiaries of a spendthrift trust request its 
termination,4 an equity court will not grant termination if the settlor is 
deceased5 and the purposes of the trust have not been fully accomplished.6 
Since the purpose of a spendthrift provision is to prevent the voluntary 
or involuntary alienation of the beneficiary's interest,7 when a court termi-
nates the trust and turns complete control over to the beneficiary, it 
obviously defeats that purpose. If, however, because of circumstances not 
known to the settlor and not anticipated by him, the continuation of 
the trust would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of its 
purpose, the court will direct or permit the termination or modification 
of the trust.8 Although for the past fifteen years Pennsylvania lower courts 
have held that a considerable reduction in trust income may constitute 
a failure of purpose of a spendthrift trust and have allowed either a 
partial or complete termination under these circumstances,9 no appellate 
court has granted a termination for this reason.10 Where a support or 
annuity trust is involved, however, there is authority to the effect that a 
reduction of income may constitute a frustration of purpose, and that an 
invasion of the corpus may be allowed in such circumstances even without 
2 Principal case at 335. 
a Ibid. 
4 If all the beneficiaries do not consent, or there are unascertained contingent remain-
dermen who cannot consent, the trust will not be terminated. Kamerly Estate, 348 Pa. 
225, 35 A. (2d) 258 (1944). 
5 If the settlor is living and both he and the beneficiaries consent, the trust may be 
terminated even though its purposes have not been accomplished. Bowers' Trust Estate, 
346 Pa. 85, 29 A. (2d) 519 (1943); 2 TRUSIS RFsrATEMENT §338, comment h, §339 (1935). 
6 GRISWOLD, SPENDTIIRIFr TRUSIS, 2d ed. §517 (1947); 2 TRUSIS RFsrATEMENT §337, 
comment l, §338, comment a (1935). 
7 1 Scorr, TRUSTS §153.3 (1939). 
8 2 TRUSTS RFsrATEMENT §336 (1935); 1 TRUSTS RFsrATEMENT §167 (1935). 
9 Auchu's Estate, 38 Pa. D. & C. 33 (1939); Honeywell Estate, 70 Pa. D. & C. 472 (1950); 
Kelby Estate, 80 Pa. D. & C. 1 (1952). 
10 Vines v. Vines, 143 Tenn. 517, 226 S.W. 1039 (1920); Brumbaugh v. Adcock, 235 
Mo. App. 643, 144 S.W. (2d) 823 (1940); Brandt v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., (N. Y. 
Sup.Ct. 1943) 43 N.Y.S. (2d) 255. For current statements that a rise in the cost of living 
and a reduction of income do not constitute a failure of purpose, see Maley v. Citizens 
National Bank of Evansville, 120 Ind. App. 642, 92 N.E. (2d) 727 (1950); Wogman v. Wells 
Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 123 Cal. App. (2d) 657, 267 P. (2d) 423 (1954). 
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the consent of the remaindermen.11 In these cases the courts infer that 
the support of the life beneficiary is the primary purpose of the trust, 
and that partial termination, therefore, furthers the settlor's intent. This 
inference has not been carried forward to the case of a spendthrift trust, in 
which there is a specific provision operating to prevent the beneficiary 
from reaching his interest. In this situation the courts have not allowed 
the general aim to provide support to override the explicit prohibition 
against alienation.12 The trust involved in the principal case contained 
a specifically expressed purpose to support the son under any circum-
stances. Since this conflicted with the spendthrift provision, the court 
held that the latter should control on the assumption that the testatrix 
must have realized there would be a change in circumstances and there-
fore would have provided for advances if she had intended the support 
provision to predominate.13 This conclusion is questionable. It is at 
least reasonably doubtful whether a person in 1916 could have foreseen 
the extent of change in the current economy. Nevertheless, the decision 
is in accord with Pennsylvania common law which denies termination 
in any case where contingent remaindermen are involved, regardless of a 
failure of purpose.14 Under the provisions of the Pennsylvania Estates 
Act of 1947,w which liberalized the requirements for terminations of 
spendthrift trusts, this trust probably would have been modified. Although 
this act cannot affect previously established trusts, there is nothing to 
prevent the courts from adopting the statutory policy and exercising it 
under their own equitable powers.16 Rather than giving effect to the 
spendthrift provision, irrespective of the welfare or interest of the bene-
ficiary,17 the court would have done better to grant the relief in accord-
ance with the policy of the Estates Act and the trust's express purpose 
of support. As it stands, the principal case represents another example 
of the unfortunate results often produced by the much-criticized dead 
hand.18 
Norman A. Zilber, S. Ed. 
•l,l Nirdlinger's Estate, 331 Pa. 135, 200 A. 656 (1938); In re Wolcott, 95 N.H. 23, 56 
A. (2d) 641 (1948), noted in 47 Mica. L. REv. 422 (1949); Bolles v. Boatmen's National 
Banlc of St. Louis, 363 Mo. 949, 255 S.W. (2d) 725 (1953). See Segelken v. Segelken, 26 N.J. 
Super. 178, 97 A. (2d) 501 (1953). 
12 In matters of administration, however, the courts do modify trusts contrary to the 
specific intent of the settlor. 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEF.S, rev. ed., §561 (1951); Bruns-
wick, "The Court Moves The Dead Hand," 15 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 24 (1936). 
13 Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. J. R. Shanley Estate Co., 113 N.J. Eq. 562, 167 A. 
865 (1933); Rogers v. English, 130 Conn. 332, 33 A. (2d) 540 (1943). 
14 See notes 1 and 2 supra; 24 TEMPLE L. Q. 84 (1950). 
15 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1950) tit. 20, §301.2. The act provides that spendthrift 
trusts can be terminated without the consent of the remaindermen if there is a failure 
of purpose. See Lefever, "Termination of Trusts in Pennsylvania," 96 UNIV. PA. L. 
REv. 305 (1948). 
16 See Kelby Estate, note 7 supra. 
11 See Borsch Estate, 362 Pa. 581, 67 A. (2d) 119 (1949). 
18 GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 2d ed., §§391-393 (1947); 63 HARv. L. REv. 714 
(1950). 
